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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
prospects for independent refiners and marketers do not seem to be overly
bright, the short run overall industry picture appears to be one of in-
creasing competition rather than increasing monopoly power."
The principle strength of Politics lies in its massive accumulation of
names, dates and quotations. Engler also skilfully outlines the essen-
tial characteristics of political democracy from the viewpoint of a liberal
political scientist. For this reason alone, the book merits the attention
of our political and business leaders; many of whom have never been
exposed to the challenging issues he raises.
CHARLES M. HEWITTt
SOCIETY AND THE LAW. By F. James Davis, Henry H. Foster, Jr., C. Ray
Jeffery, and E. Eugene Davis. New York: The Free Press of
Glencoe. 1962. Pp. vi, 488. $6.95.
Two sociologists, a law professor, and a practicing attorney' have
collaborated to write a book "to persuade the student of sociology that
law is relevant to an understanding of society and the student of law that
it is always pertinent to look at the social purposes and consequences of
a legal rule."' The authors hoped that their work would be adopted as a
text in a pre-legal course, or as a law school course, along with being
useful to social scientists.
The book is divided into three sections: law and social organization,
law and social change, and lawyers as a professional group. Each
author has written a chapter in each section either alone, in collaboration
with, or assisted by, one or two of the others.
In the first section, law and social organization, Professor Davis
gives a survey of the history of the sociological approach to the study of
law and notes the contributions made by American and European legal
scholars. He is impressed with the legal realists, especially Llewellyn,
and is careful to point out that legal realism is not a "school of thought."
15. See Hewitt, The Prhtciple Factors Affecting Oil Marketing, Now and To-
morrow, NATIONTAL PEmol.uarm NEws, (Dec., 1959).
t Professor of Business Law, Indiana University.
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Llewellyn would have liked this as he abhorred labelling the realists.' To
him legal realism was a way of looking at things. It was a methodology.'
In his chapter on law as a type of social control, Professor Davis
tells us that law is one means of accomplishing the process of social con-
trol. He enlarges on what is sometimes regarded as the traditional defi-
nition of law-rules interpreted and enforceable by the courts of a politi-
cal community. Included in Davis' definition are the agencies and pro-
cedures by which the rules are created, applied and enforced. "Law," he
says, "is a formal social control because it utilizes explicit rules of con-
duct, planned sanctions and designated specialists."5
In the section about lawyers as a professional group, Professor Jef-
fery sketches the history of the profession in the United States and in Eng-
land and the status of the profession in this country and abroad. He
presents statistics on the number of lawyers in the United States, informs
us how and where they practice, what they earn and the various roles they
are asked to play in our society.
In the chapter on legal education, Professor Foster recreates the con-
troversy over the adoption of the case method in law teaching. He re-
lates what Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Chicago and Michigan have done
and are doing to present a less traditional program for the study of law.
The section on law and social change is the most provocative part of
the book. It begins with Professors Davis' and Foster's description of
the judicial process, the meaning of the adversary system and a discus-
sion of legal reasoning. Davis describes legal structures in the United
States, discusses the controversy over the value of the jury system, the
problems of court congestion and judicial selection and tenure.
In the chapter on public law and social change, Professor Foster
gives an account of the segregation problem in the context of law and
social change. He shows how law and other institutions in our society
are involved and must be utilized to implement the Supreme Court's de-
cision in the "School Segregation Cases.".. "In the final analysis,"
writes Foster, "law with its coercive sanction and its institutional limi-
tations cannot by itself eliminate discrimination in areas where there is
unity of opposition rather than a substantial division of opinion and a
recognition of values other than white supremacy."'  Legal procedures
are not in themselves always the sole avenue to take in resolving this
3. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realismn--Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HA.
L. REV. 1222, 1233 (1931).
4. LLEWELLYN, THE Co mmoN LAW TRADITIO.N-DECIDING APPEALS 509 (1960).
5. P. 60.
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. P. 189.
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problem. "Legal procedure lends itself to dilatory tactics, is costly, and,
due to public trials, may occasion recrimination. . . . Damage suits
may be expensive, and again the jury may be unsympathetic to a Negro
plaintiff."'  In contrast, administrative implementation of civil rights
offers a better prospect for effective legal action by eliminating many of
the cumbersome procedures of a court trial. An appeal to the courts may
be taken from an agency decision, thus preserving constitutional protec-
tions. Professor Foster realizes that both administrative and court de-
cisions might be defied. Nevertheless, he cautions agains the use of
troops or marshals to enforce the law because he feels it tends to increase
hostility and resentment. While one can appreciate this caveat, com-
pletely convincing alternatives to the sanction of force in support of law
are not offered.
Professor Foster's reliance is on social movement to help implement
court decisions. He wisely calls for a continuation of the really signifi-
cant "Crusade" that we are seeing in our time-that of Dr. Martin
Luther King and organizations like CORE-in effectuating the com-
plete breakdown of the old segregated order. In one of the concluding
paragraphs to this chapter, Foster writes:
It may not be an exaggeration to say that desegregation is the
most important and difficult social experiment ever undertaken
by our government, that our democratic society will be imperiled
if it fails, and that our future as,a nation and a world power
depends upon its successful conclusion. For the solution of the
myriad problems incident to this social change, lawyers and so-
cial scientists will be needed to combine their skills and insights.
Never before has there been such an opportunity to study, test,
and apply the principles and knowledge of sociology and psy-
chology, and never have law-trained men had such an urgent
need for research and help from other disciplines.9
Here is one place where the noble objectives of the book become meaning-
ful and useful.
There is much about which to argue in the chapter on criminal jus-
tice and social change. Professor Jeffery is concerned with the emphasis
placed on psychiatry and the social services in the criminal law field. He
states, "The advocates of the psychiatric approach want therapy in place




as sick people, and crime is a social illness."'" Jeffery criticizes the psy-
chiatric approach in three ways: there is no evidence that mental disease
causes criminal behavior; there is no evidence that psychiatry can reform
criminals or non-criminals; there is no evidence that psychiatry is a sci-
ence. He attacks psychiatrists for ignoring their critics, for ignoring
the fact that "crime is a social reaction to behavior, just as therapy is a
social reaction to behavior,"" for assuming that "the only objective of
criminal law is to rehabilitate criminals,"' 2 for ignoring the social aspects
of punishment, for ignoring the fact that man is a social animal who
must meet the demands of society, and, most of all, for trying to take
over criminal law.
"The insanity plea is the most overrated and most over-discussed is-
sue in criminal law. More has been written on it than any other aspect
of law, yet in practice it is of minor importance," writes Jeffery." He
believes that if capital punishment were eliminated, there would be com-
paratively few cases involving insanity pleas. Jeffery thinks that the
psychiatrist's testimony should be relevant in sentencing, not in the de-
termination of guilt. He feels that psychiatrists assume that the guilt of
a defendant is not important; they want to testify as to how the case
ought to be disposed of. Psychiatrists want "the defendant to go to a
mental hospital rather than an electric chair." 4
These latter statements seem unsophisticated and unenlightened,
especially from a sociology professor. With the number of mentally ill
in this country, the over-crowded conditions in mental hospitals, under-
staffed mental health clinics and the dearth of psychiatrists, it seems
highly dubious whether all psychiatrists, or for that matter, many psy-
chiatrists, are preoccupied with criminal law. There is evidence that
they are, in fact, reluctant to become involved with criminal trials.'
Psychiatrists are, for the most part, independent thinkers and while some
doubt the deterrent effect of punishment, 6 there are some distinguished






15. See, e.g., Salzman, Psychiatric Interviews as Evidence: The Role of the
Psychiatrist in Court-Some Suggestions and Case Histories, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
853 (1962).
16. See, e.g., Schmideberg, Offender's Attitude to Punishment, 51 J. CPzM. L., C. &
P.S. 328 (1960).
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ishment and explicitly state that psychiatry cannot take the place of
justice."
Perhaps it is a sign of our times that thoughtful persons have con-
cerned themselves with investigating the bridge between psychiatry and
the law and have written a good deal about the field. That the insanity
plea is the subject matter of many law review articles is hardly a matter
for scorn. One need only read recent opinions involving the insanity
defense to realize that many of these scholarly articles have had signifi-
cant impact on the judges."8
Jeffery has equally severe remarks for social workers. He believes
social work concepts have had a great influence on the juvenile court
movement and regrets this. "Whenever social services are rendered by
means of criminal law, procedural safeguards protesting the rights of in-
dividuals are ignored or slighted."' 9  As a statement, this may be true.
However, whether the statement applies to juvenile courts generally is a
totally different matter. Jeffery does not point out the important dis-
tinction between the function of the judge in a juvenile court and the
social service staff. The judge is a decision-maker; the social worker
carries out an entirely different function. Generally, a social worker
(other than a probation officer who may or may not be a social worker)
in juvenile court proceedings provides casework or counseling services to
the juvenile offender as well as helps the judge understand the offender
and recommends a disposition fitted to the offender's specific needs.2"
There are many juvenile courts in the United States. Some jurisdic-
tions have separate courts and separate judges for juveniles, some include
juvenile matters in family law courts, some provide for probate, circuit,
county or municipal court judges to sit as juvenile court judges." It is
17. De. Melitta Schmideberg, President of the Association for the Psychiatric
Treatment of Offenders, has written:
Punishment is a necessary tool of justice and the community's expression of
censure. Each trial not only asserts that a particular offender is guilty, but
reasserts that the particular act is wrong in the strongest terms of disapproval
the community has at its disposal. Thus, it not only deters, but educates and
socializes. Psychiatry can only adjust the offender to existing laws and social
mores; it cannot create anything to take the place of such laws. Psychiatrists
should not have the powers rightfully belonging to the courts-passing on a
person's guilt or innocence and deciding the length of an offender's incarceration.
Schmideberg, The Promise of Psychiatry: Hopes of Disillusionment, 57 Nw. L. REv.
19,27 (1962).
18. See, e.g., Mr. Justice Clark's dissenting opinion in Lynch v. Overholser, 82 S.
Ct. 1063, 1072-77 (1962) ; United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).
19. P. 289.
20. Silverman, Lawyers and Social Workers in Juvenile Proceedings, 6 CRIME &
DELiNQuENcY 262 (1960).
21. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee of the Judiciary,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1414 (1960).
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difficult to generalize about juvenile courts and certainly much too sweep-
ing to write: "Because the juvenile court is both a legal agency and a
social work agency, these two functions are often confused . . . The
court procedure is viewed as a welfare procedure rather than a criminal
trial. As a result, the juvenile is denied certain basic rights available to
adults."2  There is some evidence of social agencies having a less than
healthy influence on juvenile courts.2" In some jurisdictions, the ju-
venile court judge has no control over probation and parole officers who
are appointed by welfare agencies. In one state the welfare commissioner
appoints juvenile court judges. However, the Juvenile Court in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, for example, cannot be said to use welfare procedures.
And, one need only read some of the United States Senate hearings on
juvenile delinquency to learn that this court is not alone in this respect.2'
One of the major problems in juvenile courts today is determining
whether those brought before it are sufficiently protected in their con-
stitutional rights. On the one hand there must be a continuation of the
underlying philosophy of the court-that of treating the youngsters as
juvenile offenders, not criminals, impressing upon them the fact that
they have been involved in anti-social behavior and, if necessary, provid-
ing them with social services so that they will be able to develop as
healthy adults. On the other hand, the child brought before the court
should be apprised of a particular breach of conduct; should be able to
confront his accuser, and generally, in keeping with the philosophy of the
court, be afforded the protection of the Constitution. Jeffery does not
discuss this vital problem in any depth. This is unfortunate because it is
precisely in this area where there is so much misunderstanding on the
part of social scientists and lawyers.
Professor Foster in his chapter on family law in a changing society
thinks social workers have played and can play a most useful role in the
family law field. Foster has in mind the tremendous work being done
by social workers in family law courts. With their specialized knowledge
in understanding human relationships, social workers are called upon to
assist in marriage and divorce problems.
Professor Foster questions the concept of fault which has permeated
our divorce laws. The grounds for divorce, as well as the defenses to
divorce, are based on this concept. The "innocent and injured spouse"
22. P. 289.
23. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 11, at 1411-12.
24. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 11, at 1419-23; Hearings Before a Cubcommittee of
the Senate Committee of the judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1163-71 (1960) ; Hearings
Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee of the judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
1002-13 (1959).
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is the subject of divorce procedures. Fault is so often relational in a
marriage break-up that it is not useful to talk in these terms. In contrast,
the "therapeutic approach" to divorce proceedings is both enlightening
and progressive.
It is difficult to evaluate a book that attempts to do so much for so
many. I think the book can provide sociologists with an interesting ac-
count of law's relation to society. I worry about the book's total impact
on undergraduates. Can much be gained in describing for these people
court congestion problems, what foundations are doing to promote the
behavioral sciences in the law schools, or the impact women lawyers are
making on the profession? The value of the book to this reviewer is in
the chapters, especially those written by Professor Foster and Professor
Davis, which are sturdy enough to provide law students with insight into
familiar areas. Foster's piece on family law would complement case-
book treatment of that subject. His chapter on public law could put con-
stitutional law problems in their proper perspective. Professor Davis'
contribution to the book can complement courses in jurisprudence. For
these purposes Society and the Law is recommended.
SANFORD N. KATZt
t" Associate Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America.
